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Roben Lowell, generally a great admirer of Elizabeth I3ishop's work,
once remarked of her early poems that 'On the surface, her poems are
observations-surpa<;singly accurate, witty and well-arranged, but
nothing more'.' Lowell conspicuously ignored a vocabulary of 'depths'
when referring to Bishop's work, so one is therefore led to believe by
his closing remark ('but nothing more') that her surfaces constitute the
entire work and that speculation concerning depths may well be a
fruitless or misdirected critical activity. Lowell's remark seems another
case of one poet damning another with faint praise, but he genuinely
admired I3ishop's work, as his dedication of 'Skunk Hour' to her
attests. The implication of his remark remains, however: surfaces are
somehow inferior to depths, and represent thinner versions of the
world than those revealed by the hermeneutic unfoldings of the veiled
and self-sufficient attributes of 'deeper' works.
Lowell's identification of surfaces with observational accuracy
points to an issue marking a critical fissure in modernist aesthetics,
particularly as it relates to I3ishop's literary forebears-Moore, Stevens,
Ransom and Williams. Williams, particularly, developed apoetics that
was primarily observational. He rejected the deep structures of Eliot
and high modernism, the historical resonances, psychological labyrinths
and symbolic systems, in favour of a bare, objective form of realism
that threw the reader back onto the immediacy oflanguage itself, rather
than having language stand as a test of the reader's interpretive
fortitude. From this fissure arose the language poets, such as Robert
Crecley and Charles Olson, who fully explored the postmodernist
embrace of language's quiddity, its sense of being just born into the
world, and its potential to refer to nothing more than the processes of
its own making.
Bishop admired Williams's objective language and his ability to
make sharp use of his material rather than searching for something
'inside'. But she resisted his appropriation of realistic details as its own
25
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
justification and was uneasy about what she called his 'exploitation of
loneliness', rather than its exploration. Lowell is therefore right to
identify the same, observational element in Bishop's poetry and to
align it with what became the postmodernist preoccupation with
surfaces. For him, this element constituted Bishop's 'intense difference',
but his comment also reveals his ambivalence towards the direction
American poetry was taking.
Nothing in Lowell's ambivalence is surprising; it does little more,
in this instance, than reveal tensions in his own deeply modernist
aesthetic heritage which positioned deep structures as the guiding
principle of most modernist literary and artistic production, and the
most fundamental assumption of much modernist aesthetic discourse.
Even amongst contemporary materialist critics such as Terry Eagleton,
who in The Ideology of the Aesthetic is derisive of the Romantic
heritage of modernist aesthetics back to Kant, we find a reticence to
confront the non-metaphysicality of surfaces directly. In his hyperbolic
paraphrase of Nietzsche's attempts to shake the aesthetic free of the
idealism of Romantic structure, Eagleton ironically says that 'Art
instructs us in the profound truth of how to live superficially, to halt at
the sensuous surface rather than to hunt the illusory essence heneath it.
Perhaps superficiality is the true essence of life, and depth a mere veil
thrown over the authentic banality of things'.2
Eagleton, caught like Nietzsche between old prejudices and new
recognitions, cannot fully sound his own ironic comment that
'superficiality is the true essence of life', which leads to a reductive
and ultimately limited aesthetic perspective, especially when applied
to many postmodernist texts and artworks. As Lowell already
understood, the effon to 'hunt the illusory essence beneath [surfaces]'
may be, in many cases, wasted effort. More surprising is it, however, to
hear Adrienne Rich, also an admirer ofBishop's 'powers ofobservation
... her wit, her intelligence', point to Bishop's 'impenetrability' and
intellectual 'obliquity', especially in poems such as 'The Map'.3 Rich,
aligned with an aesthetic sensibility similar to Eagleton's, wants to
read Bishop as pan of the feminist and lesbian tradition. She too is
looking for the allegorical content in Bishop's work that deep structure
enables, and emphasises that poems 'examining intimate relationships'
in Bishop's work are almost entirely absent.4 Rich's reading agenda
then is an ethical one: works amenable to allegorical readings are more
accessihle than those that are predominantly observational. As an
ethical stance, impenetrability may be a source of feminist valour, but
aesthetically, Rich's remark once more directs our attention to the
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surfaces of Bishop's poetry where, in the profit and loss economy of
much aesthetic discourse, it connotes loss rather than gain.
Similarly ambivalent tones are heard in discussions of Wallace
Stevens's poetry; his work is frequently praised for 'consistency' and
'integrity' yet often condemned for 'monotony' and 'mannerisms'. In
a remark strangely similar to Lowell's on Bishop, Randall Jarrell said
in 1962 that Stevens's poems are merely 'improvisations preserved for
us neither by good nor by bad, but by middle fortune'.5 The same
balanced but unOattering symmetries operate in the commonly received
picture of Stevens: an insurance lawyer whose ultimate value was the
imagination; a rich man whose most familiar figure is poverty; an
agnostic who willed beliefin the fiction ofan absolute; apoet frequently
condemned for being too much of aphilosopher and therefore reductive;
a man whose appreciation of the particular and the physical found its
best expression in highly abstract language. Jarrell's view was that
Stevens was at his best when he adds what is 'supcrOuous, the excess
of the spirit'. This profit and loss aesthetic is disturbed only when
Stevens is 'reduced to philosophizing', when instead of particulars he
draws on the abstract and so, like Bishop, exacerbates rather than fills
a lack.
These postures towards surfaces are not restricted to a former
critical age. We do not have to listen too hard in order to hear similar
refrains. Many good contemporary readers of poetry fall into the same
ontological impasse that Lowell and Jarrell imply: consolidating or
deep structures in postmodernist works are sought out and valorised as
unitary and universal. When they are absent, their lack is not simply
noted but configured in such a way as to support fundamentally
indeterminate readings. The absence ofdeep, consolidating structures,
they claim, directs the focus of our attention towards the work's
surface which, as the texts so frequently instruct us, cannot be penetrated.
Marjorie Perloff, for example, embraces indeterminacy in the work of
postmodernists such as Ashbery and Cage simply because 'totality'
(which, she claims, is aconsolidating, coherent symbolic structure) 'is
absent'. 'Undecidability' therefore becomes for Perloff the criterion
for indeterminacy. a hermeneutic tautology whose terms are, once
posited, inevitably and always fulfilled.6 And in the fifteen pages of
Enlarging the Temple that Charles Altieri devotes to the humorous
poetry of Frank O'Hara, for example, what he privileges, what he
thinks makes O'Hara 'so interesting a poet', is the 'pain potentially
lurking in every moment'.7 The moment in O'Hara's poetry that
Altieri seems to consider the 'peak' comes at the end of the poem, 'The
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Day Lady Died': 'the climactic stoppages of life and breath ... The
moment ... ofabsolute communication ... led them to a single ecstasy'.8
The unitary moment of this single ecstasy seems to be the experience
Altieri is looking for as a reader of poetry. But much of O'Hara's
poetry is a casual running commentary that builds into plateaux---often
based on pain, certainly, but more often and more certainly on pleasure.
Look, for example, at 'The Unfinished':
meanwhile, back at the Paris branch of contemporary depression, I am
dropping through the famous blueness like a pearl diver, I am looking
for Gregory who liveson Heart-Bed Street aild I sit with Ashbery in the
Rore because of his poem about himself in a flower-bed and we look
for Gregory in the Deux Magot because I want to cry with him about a
dear dead friend, it's always about dying, never about death I sometimes
think it's the only rea,on that any of us love each other it is raining,
Ashes heIps me finish my gall and seltzer, and we go.9
Neither unalloyed pain nor unmitigated pleasure dominate this scene.
Instead we are presented with a fragmented but powerful mix of
emotional registers humorously disrupted by O'Hara's exaggerated
pathos. The comic multiplicity of this and other O'Hara poems is too
often overlooked by those critics reading for the unifying nature of a
summary experience, and too easily embraced by those positing
indeterminacy as central to postmodernist aesthetics. Both positions
depend upon either the presence or absence of deep structure. Instead,
I would propose an aesthetic paradigm that is closer to the Deleuzian
notion of plateaux-those contiguous regions of intensity whose
development avoids any orientation towards a culmination, but which
nevertheless carry significant affect. These regions, be they
predominantly gestural, observational or intricately complex converge
at what Massumi, in his Introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, calls a
'volatile juncture, but one that is sustained as an open equilibrium of
moving parts each with its own trajectory'. 10
As a way of avoiding the ontological pitfalls of surfaces and depths,
plateaux may be a far more satisfying way of reading both Bishop
and Stevens. We are then no longer backhandedly belittling Bishop's
qualities of 'observation' by aligning them with the negative valencies
of 'surface', nor are we as inclined to see Stevens's 'philosophising' as
an essentially reductive process, or as Harold Bloom once claimed,
'a totally dead subject' .11 Instead, we trace the surfaces of a poem's
internal differences and tensions by focusing upon the way the words
work together on the page rather than articulating the hard edged
distinctions between its meaning and a set of external and pre-existing
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ethical implications. The issue is then between phenomenological
and cognitive ways of knowing the world or, for those who consider
Stevens a nco-Platonist, between Stevens's abstracted representation
of the Idea and its unsteady negotiation with the details of the sensuous
world. I do not believe Stevens is, as is often claimed, purely a poet of
mind, but very much the pragmatist absorbed by this delicate balance
between reflexive ways of knowing the world and purely cognitive
ones. Reading the surfaces then simply picks up the way that the
absence of formal presuppositions and 'deep structure' in Stevens's
and Bishop's philosophical poems points to what I will loosely call
a 'system' of pragmatic play between Idea and thing which reveals
the complex relation between logical judgement and perceptual
experience.
Such an approach is invited by one of Stevens's later and finest
poems, 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome' by the conditional figure of
'As if' in the second to last line.
It is a kind of total grandeur at the cnd,
With every visible thing enlarged and yet
No more than a bed, a chair and moving nuns,
The immensest thcatre, the pillared porch.
The hook and candle in your ambered room,
Total grandeur of a total edifice.
Chosen by an inquisitor of structures
For himself. He stops upon this threshold,
As if the design of all his words takcs fonn
And frame from thinking and is realized. I2
In its final figure of the dying philosopher George Santayana, the poem
seems to conflate the binary life and death, poetry and philosophy
distinction by 'living in two worlds, impenitent As to one, and, as to
one, most penitent'. Penitence here marks the crossing point, the point
Merleau-Ponty terms a 'chiasma', where 'The threshold, Rome, and
that more merciful Rome' are coincident, perhaps even becoming
'alike in the makeofthe mind'. For Stevens to be truly a 'poet of mind,,
the sensuous Rome and the 'more merciful Rome' would need to
conflate at this point. The metaphysical would then assume the sensuous
and the literal the anagogical. But do they ever conflate, and is their
apparent likeness ever more than a psychic mimesis of surfaces? Or
does penitence function more precisely as a dijJerend holding one
world in suspension while allowing us to fully indulge in the other?l3
If so. the final lines of the poem seem less a conflation than a
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celebration of total grandeur in which the integrity ofdiscrete structures
is preserved. The 'Inquisitor of structures ... stops upon this threshold,
As if the design of his words takes form And frame from thinking and
is realized'. The two planes, the physical, sensuous Rome and the
aesthetic (philosophical) Rome are demonstrated, at the moment of
penitence, to be co-extensive, and, as if laminated. co-ordinate.
While it may be true that the two are alike in the 'make of the mind',
the 'As if confirms their identities as actually different; sensuous
experience. 'The life of the city [which] never lets go, nor do you Ever
want it to'. literally crosses the metaphysical domain of Santayana's
mental world, but never fully identifies with it. as if to deflate his own
rather grandiose conception that thought can only grasp what it has
itself created. These lines hold 'things' and the 'idea of things' in a
delicate balance, never letting one fall into the other, but suggesting
the possibility that one could nearly will them so. The laminate
construction or Stevens's poem then effectively directs our attention
to criss-crossing surfaces. and to where they intersect, in a sort of
sensuous pragmatism often overlooked by critics more inclined to read
him as consummate 'self-consciousness' or metaphoric intelligence,
as the 'poet-philosopher' or as 'intelligence in craft'. A play ofconcepts
and images that do not add up to an architecture of propositions or
beliefs that one either accepts or rejects, this pragmatism negotiates the
continually changing nature of the dynamic relation between logical
judgement and sensuous experience without ever resorting to absolute
truths and holds the potential for what Wittgenstcin terms 'knowing
our way around the world'. Stevens's poetry is not dialectically
synthetiC-it does not overcome polarities as 'philosophical' poetry
normally would but reinvents them as a psychic mimesis of surfaces
by holding them in a delicate balance.
It may now be more useful to see Stevens striving for what could be
loosely termed 'system' rather than balance-a 'system' to universalise
a form of rationalism that he reflectively recognises to be incapable of
fulfilment other than fictionally or poetically. We can now see why it
is important to read his poetry along the surfaces rather than mining
for deep structures. For only by tracing these trajectories can we see the
intersecting tensions of his poems, those geometric points defining
the means by which poetic objects are created out of the formal
presuppositions of objectivity in general. For Stevens, especially in
poems like 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome'. the important question
is always: are the empirical facts, the sensuous details. taken as 'gi ven'
or can this 'givenness' be dissolved into further rational forms: in what
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ways can 'givenness' be cast as a product of our reason? Stevens's
poetry therefore is and is not philosophical: it is philosophical in the
'critical' or Kantian sense because, proceeding by no rules. it searches
for a rule or a set of rules to articulate a 'system' reconciling 'things'
with the 'idea of things', and it is not philosophical because the
ontological structures philosophy normally depends upon are absent.
Kant himself repeatedly emphasises that reason fails in its attempt
to make the final leap towards the synthetic definition of objects
because its 'conceptions are ... mere ideas, and do not relate to any
ohject in any kind of experience ... They are purely problematical in
their nature. and. as aids to the heuristic exercise of the faculties. form
the hasis of the regulative principles for the systematic employment
of the understanding in the field of possihle experience' .14 And
the third Critique emphasises that aesthetic perception is therefore
distinguished from theoretical understanding hy its not conforming to
the rule that every intuition be brought under an adequate or
corresponding concept. It is precisely the incommensurable nature of
perception that sets it apart from theory and all epistemological critique
and makes the laws regulating and relating to it the central problem
of systematisation.
I do not want to make Stevens Kant, but to show how the complexity
and fragility of his attempt to work the sensuousness of the 'structure
of things' against the more abstract 'structure ofideas'-a dichotomy
whose power depends upon the tension between idealism and
phenomenology-is more Kantian in its dependence upon reflection
than it is Platonic. The conflicting demands of this task are exemplified
most fully in the volitional power of 'Adagia' where Stevens claims
'The final helief is to believe in a fiction. which you know to he a
fiction. there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to know that
it is a fiction and that you believe in it willingly' .15 In those final
fragile moments of 'The Old Philosopher in Rome' it is then consistent
that Santayana stands hefore the 'Total grandeur of a total edifice,
Chosen hy an inquisitor of structures For himself. In the same
unrecuperated movement, the poet 'beholds himselfin the philosopher'
just as, many years before, in 'The Snow Man', the listener. aware of
his own emptiness. 'beholds Nothing that is not there and the nothing
that is' (54).
Belief itself is, however, labile. its ontological instability reflected
most strongly in 'As You Leave the Room' where Stevens wonders
whether he has unwittingly committed himself to philosophy, thereby
tipping the balance to '[living) a skeleton's life. As a disbeliever in
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reality'. These misgivings seem an inevitable consequence ofStevens's
earlier worry in 'EstMtique du MaJ' that
The greatest poverty is not to live
In a physicaJ world, to fecI that one's desire
Is too difficult to tell from despair. Perhaps
After death. the non-physicaJ people, in paradise.
Itself non-physical, may, by chance, ohserve
The green com gleaming and experience
The minor of what we feel. 16
The majors of this polarity are, once more, the 'metaphysicals' that
'Lie sprawling in ... August heat' and their intersection with the
minors ('what we feel') constitutes the planar co-ordinates, the abscissa
and the ordinate. defining the strangeness and paradoxes of the world.
Here the structure of things and the structure of ideas intersect, and it is
the tracing of these disparate trajectories with the mind's eye that gives
Stevens's critical poems their palpability. The mind becomes a finger;
metaphysics becomes phenomenology.
The mobility of these structures becomes in Stevens's hands an
unequalled power to slip down through the mind's strata, but the
orientations of their geometry are not const ant; they change according
to the ambient space in which the metaphysical traverses the actual.
Stratification for Stevens is then the representation of logic imposed
upon a world of chaos-it is a constant, renewed creation. The poet
here is not God. but we do see in Stevens's poetry something analogous
to the organising power of the classical artist who makes the world by
organising forms and substances, codes and rhythms. in such a way
that the abstract never directly opposes the figurative. Thinking the
'structure of things' against the 'structure of ideas' seems then a
satisfying way of balancing the demands of the outer life-Stevens's
concern with history, politics and science-with the inner Ii fe of play,
and of becoming a truly comprehensive poet who in the eyes of
Stevens's subject. Santayana, can appropriate the diverse talents of
Lucretius, Dante and Goethe (exemplars of materialism. Thomism and
Romanticism). Stevens knows, as far back as 'Notes Towards aSupreme
Fiction', that 'Two things of opposite natures seem to depend On one
another. as a man depends On a woman. day on night. the imagined
On the rear ,17 and that the earth which reveals itself' in dilTcrcncc' is,
in thc final revelation of the imagination. apprehended. Even though
Stevens. in some moments, may have desired to surpass oppositions
and become the master of theory. he knew full well that 'one is always
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writing two things at the same time in poetry and it is this that produces
the tension characteristic of poetry. One is the true subject and the
other is the poetry of the subject' .18
If we now relurn to 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome'. it is ea"y to
see, on the simplest level, that the true subject is Santayana and that the
poetry of the subject is the life of the imagination, the desire to
comprehend dissonances in a moment of theoretical insight. But my
claim is that these two elements are held forever apart by the final
closure of the poem. Here, for the first time shifting from second to
third person, Stevens writes, 'He stops upon his threshold, As if the
design of all his words takes form And frame from thinking and is
realized'. These lines are generally read as the philosopher's triumph
over difference. as if he wholly realises his philosophy in death and
demonstrates that philosophy is indeed a preparation for death (rather
than something dead or deadly). According to this reading. Santayana
not only remains the master of his own texts but also, and more
poignantly. becomes their master only in death: he realises all he has
written; thought is translated into reality; intention and text coincide
ultimately. But in a second. stronger reading, one hears the more
powerful murmurings of the 'as if suggesting that this concurrence of
thing and its idea cannot be synthesised, only held in balance. In this
new pathos, the design of the philosopher's words does indeed take
form and frame from thinking: it removes itself from thought, separates
itself from his intention as a tone 'defines itself and separates' and is
realised at his death as a textual panern only. The tirst reading moves
predictably [rom cause to effect. casting the philosopher as active. his
words as passive. The second reading. however. regards the
philosopher's end as a consequence of the words' active design in the
same way that 'It is poverty's speech that seeks us out the most'.
Elizabeth Bishop's work follows similar directions to Stevens's
though they are, I think, less complex. Her work is. like Stevens's.
concerned with the divided. unreconciled singleness ofour experience,
but it is less likely to inhabit those nodal points where the metaphysical
crosses the sensuous. opting instead [or a more deflected. displaced
sort ofself-cxamination. She exists in a self-imposed state ofobjectivity,
split between exacting observational skills and a reluctance or inability
to use them full y or to direct them towards hersel f. Balance is therefore
no longer an issue for Bishop. who instead invests heavily in the power
of finely wrought observational detail in order to articulate a 'system'
revealing the peculiarity of images. Looking at Bishop looking at the
'The Man-Moth', for example, we see the textures of sensuous details
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slip into the soluble, viscous milieu of surrealist illusion:
If you catch him,
Hold up a flashlight to his eye. It's all dark pupil,
an entire night it,elf, whose haired horizon tightens
a, he stares hack, and closes up the eye. Then from the lids
one tear, his only possession, like the hcc's sting, slips.
Slyly he palms it, and if you're not paying allention
he'll swallow it. However, if you watch, he'll hand it over,
cool as from the underground springs and pure enough to drink. 19
David Kalstone links this image to Bishop's notebook entry of a dead
woman observed in the New York subway, a move that, he claims,
allows Bishop 'simultaneously to be a keen ohserver-the figure who
"tells" the poems scrutinizes every detail to extract her meaning-
and to identify with figures absent' .20 But such a close alignment
between observation and identification seems altogether 100 neatly
analogical. Like Stevens's figure in 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome',
who seems to offer the promise of a deep structure reconciling things
with the idea of things, Bishop's lines 'Then from the lids one tear,
his only possession, like the bee's sting, slips' also seem to offer the
promise of adeep, consolidating structure-the humanistic notion that
what is most important to each ofus is what we have in common with
others. In this moment of lachrymal pathos is the empathetic
identification with another being, a more natural and universal
experience defining the resting point of the other linear, more
dissociative descriptive trajectories in the poem.
The unitary moment of this scene is quickly shattered by the
succeeding lines which split the apparent identification into two
incompatible intentions, both directed towards acts of consumption.
This fracture is signalled grammatically by the presence of the
conditional 'if for the first time in the poem which functions, like
the' As if' in Stevens's 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome', as a kind of
dijjerend separating the instability of sensuous observation from the
security of metaphysical structure: 'Slyly he palms it, and ifyou're not
paying attention he'll swallow it. However, if you watch, he'll hand it
over, cold as from underground springs and pure enough to drink'.
Although drolly surrealistic, these lines achieve more than a dreamy,
quasi-Freudian critique of unitary structures. Instead, they point to
whimsical intentional states of heing or to the confrontation of highly
subjective, largely unconscious, inner tensions that always have the
potential to express themselves inconsonantly and inconsequentially.
We are then able to feci the pragmatic force of the man-moth's
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recurrent dreams without needing to explain the relation of the 'third
rail' to the 'unbroken draught of poison' or why he must therefore
'keep his hands in his pockets'. These dissonant observations do not
constitute a coherent history or psychology, but neither are they simply
indeterminate. Instead, they powerfully represent the unsenling effect
of physically enacted incongruous mental states where unmotivated
behaviours displace endings or borders and logomachy replaces
understanding.
Unlike Stevens, who strove to balance the idea of things with the
structure of things, Bishop opposes balance. but, like Stevens, she still
strives for a geometry that allows her observational surfaces to represent
the dissonance of experience as heterogeneous linguistic dispositions.
If we now return to 'The Map', we can see the reasons for Rich's
discomfort with Bishop's surfaces. Every line is pure observation, but
observation itself is predicated upon an interrogative consciousness.
These constructions simply never reproduce the sort of ethical depths
valorised and sought out by Rich; semantic resistance cannot always
become a platform for political agency. Rather, 'The Map' constructs
a sort of unconscious in all its connectability, reversibility and
susceptibility to constant modification. Like the aqueous environment
of Ashbery' s 'These Lacustrine Cities', 'The Map' inhabits an interstitial
space between liquid and solid, mental image and objective reality.
Look at the first stanza:
Land lies in water; it is shadowed grccn.
Shadows. or are they shallows, at its edges
showing the line of long sea-weeded ledges
where weeds hang to the simple blue from green.
Or docs the land lean down to lift the sea from under,
drawing it unperturbed around itself?
Along the fine tan sandy shelf
is the land tugging at the sea from under? (p.3)
Shadows become shallows, edges ledges and blues turn green. The
land first leans down to 'lift the sea from under' then its position seems
reversed so it is 'tugging at the sea from under'. The historical
precedence of land or water has nothing to do with the aesthetics of the
map itself-a mere surface flattened beneath a piece of glass. The map
which purports to guide us to a location is, from an aesthetic perspective.
a neutral flattened surface where we lose rather gain our way. 13ishop
has taken an object known primarily for its utility in guiding us from
one point to another, and restored to it an existence purged of history.
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In the process. the aesthetic preference of 'character' or 'native waters'
is sacrificed to the choices of the mapmaker. Then, neither land nor
water lends shape, but rather the map as artifice constructed by the
cartographer. Obsessed with geographical boundaries, and the precise
trajectories of latitude and longitude, the printer nonetheless allows
'the munes of seashore towns [to] run out to sea'. Bishop's words,
whether on maps or in poems, always exceed the objects to which they
point, always flirt with a discursive chaos that unsettles narrative and
leaves endings unspecified.
This map is autotelic-it traces nothing other than its own making.
which is precisely what makes it so difficult for Rich and others to
read. Tracing involves an alleged competence, some (l priori existence
or deep structure permining the tracing to exist and against which it can
be read. Instead. 'The Map' is all to do with performance, with the
shifting back and forth between a hrittle hut dynamic interrogative
subjecti vity and the reciprocally related object of perception, between
reality and the constructive mind. Both sensual and noetic. these
trajectories dissolve boundaries between physical substances. taking
them. through the act ofobservation, uponto asecond surface constituted
by the criss-crossed trajectories of the map itself and its mimetic
mental representation, where they are more properly read as apragmatic
play ofconcepts and images. In asense then. Bishop reverses Stevens's
phenomenological process: the finger now becomes a mind,
phenomenology hecomes cartography. And her emphasis on these
shifting surfaces hecomes an untelling of what is most important. a
preservation of the truth as lived experience hy preserving the force of
ohservation.
While both Bishop's and Stevens's work resist all attempts at
a1legorisation (we are unable to ever read any of their works as
something else). we can now see Bishop's as a modified Stevensian
project. Earlier I claimed his project took up the Kantian challenge
to reconcile the Idea with its sensible presentation by replacing the
philosophical with a literary absolute-the willed helief in fiction.
This was a pragmatic philosophy-in-practice whose conjoining of
speculation and textuality has strong affinities with the claims of
theory exemplified in 'To an Old Philosopher in Rome'. But in his
unwillingness to contlate the thing and its Idea. Stevens paradoxically
achieves the ahsolute as (im)possibility because speculation can
never offer itself as simply a fiction. Even though the formal verhal
expressions may be fictitious. the creative force of the poet's words
and the foundations from which the poetically fahulous springs have
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a firm basis in truth. Only then can he represent the Idea not as
something transcendent, but as the very process of self-reflexive
production, which is why I call Stevens a 'critical' rather than
'philosophical' poet.
Bishop modifies this project by employing the different tendencies
of a predominantly observational disposition to deflect our attention
from the transcendent qualities of the Idea or from the conditions of
deep structure towards the emergence of the Idea from the textures
and details of sensuous observation. Following on from Stevens,
she constantly asks how value is developed from individual and
unamplified details. How does the observer's apparent lack ofinsistence.
devoid of rhetorical pressure, rise to significance? 'The Map' really
does then become noetic, existing as a textured act of constructive
mind transposed onto the flat surface of a physical document. The
reality of the map is not only what it is, but also its double-its mimetic
mental surface or image. Both are irreducible to each other, yet
indistinct at their boundaries. The real is thus emptied of a singularly
objective status as it approaches the edges ofcommunicable perception
and the map itself is interioriscd at the moment of perception, then re-
objectified in its re-presentation. Observation is thus rolled back into
experience, imbuing the real with apower far greater than the details of
its own facticity:
Arc they assigned, or can the countries pick their colors?
-What suits the characters or the native waters hesl.
Topography displays no favorites; North's a<; near as West,
More delicate than the historians' arc the map-makers' colors
(p.3)
Amongst later poets, the work of Robert Creeley was clearly
foreshadowed by both Stevens and Bishop. Creeley takes the
investigation of surfaces one step further by completely breaking the
tenuous relationship between subject and field of experience they
had so delicately articulated. For Creeley, subject is field ofexperience
so. rather than discussing the trajectories of antiU1eticai or contingent
surfaces in a poem we can now talk about only one-the straight
line from nowhere to nothing. the gap between Creeley's idea of
humanness and the world which it must negotiate. Look, for example,
at 'TIle Rhyme':
There is the sign of
the flowcr-
to horrow the theme.
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But what or where to recover
what is not love
too simply
I saw her
and behind her there were
flowers. and behind them
nothing.2t
The tension here results from the ambiguities of a present world in
which everything exists in name only. so that one sees the signs
entirely subtracted from the possibility of anything existing behind
them.
The world of signs is the representation of an entirely visual world.
a world without depth. When Crccley tries to discover some deeper
structure for the sign. to recover 'what is not love too simply' he
discovers a void ('behind them nothing'). a simple surface. mocking
his desire to search in the first place. The texture created by the play of
Stevens's and Bishop's system of intersecting surfaces has now gone.
and we are left with only language to fill the gap betwecn concept and
image. between perceptual experience and reOcxive consciousness.
What in Stevens and Bishop was a dynamic relationship betwecn
experience and interrogative consciousness has been turned by Crecley
into the static isolation ofsensitive despair-the primary ex~rienceof
increasing distance. of a consciousness that is withdrawing from the
sorts of phenomenological interplay so skillfully engaged by both
Stevens and Bishop.
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